Now, while the full record may not be uncovered any time soon, if ever, little by little light is seeping:

After the fall of Baghdad, three years ago, the United States military began a secret investigation of the decision-making within Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. The study, carried out by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, drew on captured documents and interviews with former Baath Party officials and Iraqi military officers, and when it was completed, last year, it was delivered to President Bush. The full work remains classified, but “Cobra II,” a recently published book about the early phases of the war, by the Times reporter Michael Gordon and Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, has disclosed parts of the study, and the Pentagon has released declassified sections, which Foreign Affairs has posted on its Web site. Reading them, it is easy to imagine why the Administration might resist publication of the full study. The extracts describe how the Iraq invasion, more than any other war in American history, was a construct of delusion. Frustratingly, however, we now understand much more about the textures of fantasy in Saddam’s palaces in early 2003 than we do about the self-delusions then prevalent in the West Wing.

[...]

The President and the members of his war cabinet now routinely wave at the horizon and speak about the long arc of history’s judgment—many years or decades must pass, they suggest, before the overthrow of Saddam and its impact on the Middle East can be properly evaluated. This is not only an evasion; it is bad historiography. Particularly in free societies, botched or unnecessary military invasions are almost always recognized as mistakes by the public and the professional military soon after they happen, and are rarely vindicated by time. This was true of the Boer War, Suez, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and it will be true of Iraq. At best, when enough time has passed, and the human toll is not so palpable, we may come to think of the invasion, and its tragicomedy of missing weapons, as just another imperial folly, the way we now remember the Spanish-American War or the doomed British invasions of Afghanistan. But that will take a very long time, and it will never pass as vindication. — The New Yorker, Issue of 2006-04-03.

Now go and tell this to the 2,342 Americans that have died in this conservative president’s "construct of delusion;" and, then, turn around and tell the over 30,000 dead iraqis that they must wait decades to witness the fruits of their "liberation."

The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is composed of a group of men (I frankly don’t know whether there are any women in it) that had long advocated the overthrow of Saddam Hussein for various reasons, including oil, the necessity to project American power in the Middle East, the need to protect an ally (Israel), and to prevent Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction. On January of 1998 the group sent a letter to president Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein:

“In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.” [letter]

Moreover, the same group sent another letter to the then majority leader in the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, urging that Congress exert pressure on the White House to persue the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Please note that this is five years before Mr. Bush warned us of the “grave and gathering danger in Iraq” if we did not do something soon. Now, if you scroll down, you’ll see the list of signatories on the letter addressed to president Clinton. If you’ve followed the events and players surrounding the Bush White House over the past couple of years, there ought to be a couple of names that immediately jump out at you, for example: Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld & Paul Wolfowitz — just to name some of major players.

Furthermore, if you were to do a search on the signatories to the letter, you’d find that many of them ended up working in the Bush administration, in various governmental positions*:

Elliott Abrams
http://uscirf.gov/cirfPages/bio_Abrams.php3?scale=1152s

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Elliott_Abrams

Richard L. Armitage
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/2991.htm

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Richard_L._Armitage

William J. Bennett
http://www.mediatransparency.org/people/wbennett.htm

Jeffrey Bergner
http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Jeffrey_Bergner&redirect=no

John Bolton
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010221-6.html

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=John_Bolton

Paula Dobriansky
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010312-9.html

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Paula_Dobriansky

Francis Fukuyama
http://www.bioethics.gov/about/fukuyama.html

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Francis_Fukuyama

Robert Kagan

Zalmay Khalilzad
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010523-7.html

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Zalmay_Khalilzad

William Kristol
http://www.mediatransparency.org/people/bill_kristol.htm

Richard Perle
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/text/20010406-7.html

http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Richard_Perle

Peter W. Rodman
http://www.dod.mil/policy/isa/bios/peter_w_rodman.html

Donald Rumsfeld
http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html

William Schneider, Jr.

Vin Weber

Paul Wolfowitz
http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/depsecdef_bio.html

R. James Woolsey

Robert B. Zoellick
http://us-mission.ch/BIOS/Zoellick.htm

(*Note that for those individuals without links I could not find any relevant information.)

Moreover, some — here and elsewhere — contend (me among them) that the Bush administration exploited 9/11 and exaggerated the threat that Saddam Hussein posed in order to pursue an elective war against Iraq. Many point to the Bush administration’s appointment of many of the above individuals to key posts, as a sign that there existed in the administration a predisposition to see Iraq as an enemy — even when it did not pose a threat to the US. Futhermore, many point to a document published by PNAC, which hints at a “larger plan” involving Iraq, the Middle East and the US military. That document includes this graft:

“Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event � like a new Pearl Harbor.” [Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, p. 51. PDF]

The above statement is offered in the context of “transforming” the US military into a more “mobile” and “nimble” fighting force; however, when placed in the context on 9/11 and its Pearl Harbor like psychological affect on the nation, one can understand how the authors of the document — that is, the members of PNAC — saw 9/11 as the opportunity to enact their plans for the Middle East, Iraq and the US military. For example, one of PNAC’s goals was to transform the military, and to do so they needed to illustrate how a more “mobile” and “nimble” force could be effectively used in combat. Now, if you recall, before going into Iraq the administration (namely, Rumsfeld) argued that we would need less troops than what the Pentagon was asking for. Now, the Pentagon lost that argument, so we went into Iraq with a lot less troops than was required to secure the country after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Of course, we’re now paying for this blunder. However, Mr. Rumsfeld, as a member of and signatory to the PNAC letter, for ideological reasons, chose to go into Iraq with less troops than what the Pentagon had originally requested.

Finally, the signatories to PNAC’s Statement of Principles include the following: Dick Cheney, Jeb Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and others.

To say that the Bush administration did not have plans for Iraq long before 9/11 is simply not borne out by the record. Now, “absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event � like a new Pearl Harbor” who knows when the Bush administration would’ve invaded Iraq; however, it’s clear that 9/11 presented the Bush administration the perfect rationale to go into Iraq and then enact the plans laid out by PNAC to remove Hussein, transform the military and project US power in the Middle East.